christiannonduality.com Blog

In the John Keats poem, Ode On A Grecian Urn, we hear: “Beauty is truth, truth beauty, that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.” I see what he was driving at but that doesn’t withstand philosophical scrutiny.

I believe it was Thomas Merton who noted that truth often comes flying in on the wings of beauty and goodness. Let me set forth how this might indeed be so.

In epistemology, the competing schools have included 1) correspondence theory 2) virtue epistemology 3) coherence theory and 4) community of inquiry (semiotic theory).

In aesthetics, the competing schools have included 1) formalism & essentialism 2) mimesis & imitationalism 3) emotionalism & expressivism and 4) agency & instrumentalism.

In ethics, the competing schools have included 1) deontological ethics 2) virtue or aretaic ethics 3) contractarian ethics and 4) teleological or consequentialist ethics.

In natural theology, the “proofs” have included the 1) ontological 2) cosmological 3) axiological and 4) teleological.

In religion, our approaches include 1) creed or dogma 2) cult or ritual 3) code or law and 4) community or fellowship.

In religion, our apologetics have included the 1) evidential 2) rational 3) presuppositional and 4) existential.

In science, our approaches include the 1) empirical 2) logical 3) practical and 4) relational and peer review.

The pattern that seems to inevitably emerge in most human enterprises seems to be a matrix that includes, on one axis, the values of 1) truth 2) beauty 3) goodness 4) unity, and, on the other axis, the different approaches to those values of the 1) objective 2) subjective 3) intraobjective 4) intersubjective.

Put differently, there seems to be a 1) descriptive 2) interpretive 3) normative and 4) evaluative moment in every type of  human value-realization. This is to suggest that every human value-realization involves 1) a description of a given reality  2) an evaluation of that reality’s significance to the individual, but even more so to the community 3) norms regarding how to best acquire or avoid that reality and 4) an interpretation of how it all re-ligates or ties-back-together. What seems to have happened in almost every academic discipline regarding various human endeavors or human value-realization is that these integrally-related moments, each which is methodologically autonomous, have been variously overemphasized at the expense of the other moments such that methods have been inflated into systems, approaches into schools, practices into conclusions.

To avoid this confusion, this conflation of methods and systems, we can draw some helpful distinctions.

The descriptive, the objective, the empirical, the evidential, the creedal, the ontological, the deontological, the formalist, the essential – all derive from a fundamental presupposition that reality is intelligible and include other such basic notions as the existence of other minds over against solipsism, as various first principles such as noncontradiction and excluded middle and other epistemic stances toward reality which cannot be proved but without which knowledge itself would not be possible. Taken together, the categories represent a correspondence theory of truth, including a metaphysical realism.

The postmodern critique did not challenge correspondence theory or metaphysical realism, a radically deconstructive postmodernism did that but was not successful, theoretically, which is not to say that we do not see a practical nihilism playing out in various aspects of postmodernity. It is to recognize that, as a system or school or conclusion, radical deconstruction was philosophically bankrupt and intrinsically incoherent.

The evaluative, the intersubjective, the relational, the existential, community and fellowship – all represent the end for which we exist and the unity and intimacy to which we aspire, hence comprise the desired consequences, the instrumental purpose of our agency, the very telos of our existence.

The normative, the intraobjective, the practical, the law, the contractarian, the prudential, the axiological, the emotional even – all represent the means by which we aspire to attain our end. Implicit in these means is the fundamental presupposition that the normative inheres in the descriptive, that epistemology is inherently normative, that our approaches to reality, even if not strictly logically-related, even if otherwise methodologically autonomous, are intellectually-related, more specifically, axiologically-integral. This coherence is not a “theory” of truth but a “test” of truth and includes, if not a robust, at least, a rudimentary moral realism and an extrinsic reward mechanism, pragmatic utility.

The interpretive, the subjective, the logical, the rational, the ritual, the cosmological, beauty for beauty’s sake, virtue for virtue’s sake – all represent the intrinsically rewarding dynamics of pure play, of art, of symmetry, elegance, parsimony, simplicity, of pattern dancing with paradox, of order mingling with chaos, of chance teasing necessity, of the systematic emerging from the random and similar fugues in reality. Like utility and coherence, such realities as symmetry, parsimony and elegance are not robustly truth-conducive but are, instead, more weakly truth-indicative. What is useful or beautiful will not necessarily be true, but since what is true is useful and beautiful, we have some probabilistic indication that a reality that is pragmatic and beautiful is certainly more likely to be true than other alternatives. Such is pragmatism, properly conceived, which has no relationship to the corrosive pragmatic so-called theory of truth, which most folks suitably deride.

Thus it is that I have derived my heuristic that the normative mediates between the descriptive and the interpretive to effect the evaluative in a probabilistic, fallibilistic manner, the probable prescinding from the necessary in the speculative grammar of my meta-metaphysic.

When it comes to adjudicating between otherwise equiplausible interpretive systems, such as religions and ideologies, I apply an equiplausibility principle, which chooses what is the most beautiful, the most good (life-giving) and the most unitive (relationship-enhancing) as likely being the most true. Ergo, Jesus.

One may wish to take a look at my related essay, Getting to Is from Ought, to see how one can ground one’s moral realism in God in a manner that is philosophically rigorous but also pluralistically aware.

Send article as PDF to

In essence, an authoritarian deontology ends up being an appeal – not to our Judaeo-Christian heritage, but – to a foundational epistemology (a method) and a robust moral realism (a conclusion). I am in deep sympathy with a moral realism that is ultimately grounded in God, but adopt that interpretive stance as a basic presupposition, which is indispensable to my faith outlook but otherwise not required as a presupposition for knowledge, itself, a method, which is fallible and probabilistic and not foundational, providing us with apodictic certainty.

As it is, with so many different authorities (religious traditions) around, all appealing to diverse foundational sources (scriptures & traditions & natural laws) and no way to successfully adjudicate between them in a logically coercive way, appeals to a foundational epistemology coupled with an authoritarian deontology aren’t going to take us very far, either meta-ethically or toward the articulation of a more global ethic.

At the same time, we can expect to reason successfully from an IS to an OUGHT, from the given to the normative, from the descriptive to the prescriptive, from a fact to a value, notwithstanding Hume’s objections, and we can distinguish between apparent and real goods, lesser and higher goods, notwithstanding any so-called naturalistic fallacy. We can also recognize, with Sartre, that, since we are similarly-situated in this somewhat universal human condition, the prescriptions we devise for any human situation we describe are going to be remarkably consistent, for all practical purposes, even if the interpretations in which we ground them are otherwise very divergent (or even relativistic), theoretically speaking.

This discussion continues here>>> (more…)

Send article as PDF to

What our own speech is not and cannot be reduced to is plain speech about some other reality. It is itself part of the enchanted reality which is part of the spokenness of God. ~ Melvyn Matthews in Both Alike to Thee

As far as I have been able to discern, the following formula best describes our human interaction with reality:

The Liturgical = The Cosmological + The Axiological

where the Liturgical = participation in a Grand Narrative or Meta-narrative comprised of our cosmological narratives (both descriptive and normative) and our axiological narratives (both evaluative and interpretive).

Our descriptive, normative, evaluative and interpretive narratives, for the most part, roughly correspond to science, philosophy, culture and religion. I explicate these interactions at great length elsewhere on this blog and its related website.

This discussion also continues at this link >>> (more…)

Send article as PDF to

Tim King, at his Post-Christian Blog, writes about change and says: “I hope I’m around to see a world where diverse and disparate faiths learn to celebrate what each has to offer to help all of us understand the Numinous a bit better than we do now.”

The changes Tim describes, the moves he prescribes, very much resonate with what I have gathered from reflecting on Thomas Merton’s writings over the years. And I have been trying to say it in so many ways myself and keep trying different approaches.

Today’s thought is this:

Our disparate faiths, including many indigenous religions as well as the great traditions, have a certain core competency. From that core competency derives the nature of their distinct contribution, their unique role, in our lives. This role is not to describe reality scientifically, not to prescribe reality morally or ethically, not to norm reality philosophically, not to manipulate reality practically, and not to govern reality politically. These functions belong, rather, to the cosmological story told by science and philosophy, what some have called Everybody’s Story, and rightly so, because it transcends cultures. And it does include our rather rudimentary, vague understanding of a Creator Spirit, one could say, pneumatologically.

There are other stories to be told by religions and cultures, which are axiological. Their role is to help us interpret reality evaluatively. More plainly, their distinct contribution is to help us celebrate and value reality.

The opposite of good religion is neither bad science nor bad morality, although many would leave us with that impression. The opposite of religion is indifference and nihilism, an attitude that reality offers nothing of enduring value to celebrate. We cannot talk people out of such an attitude with empirical evidence, logical reasoning or moral persuasion because these basic attitudes are not constructed of formal arguments. Instead, good religion forms people through exchanges of stories about lives well-lived, and through moments of celebration, and through the handing down of formative and transformative practices and through the comfort and enjoyment of fellowship in community.

Inter-religious dialogue, then, is much more an exchange of practices and has very little to do with conclusions. It has a lot more to do with celebratory methods and transformative processes and very little to do with philosophical systems and products of moral reasoning. Religion is more so a participatory engagement and much less a propositional exchange.

In my view, then, much of the strife on our planet comes from religion masquerading as cosmology, attempting but failing to co-opt the prerogatives of good science and good philosophy with  pseudo-religion. Creationism isn’t bad religion; it’s bad science. Theocratic rule isn’t bad religion; it’s bad political science. Misogyny and homophobia aren’t bad religion; they’re grounded in bad anthropology and are bad morality. Such dysfunctional approaches to reality inevitably result when religion departs from its core competency, strays from its distinct role and fails to attend to its own unique contribution, which Merton emphasized was transformation not socialization.

Below is a more philosophically nuanced discussion of these dynamics. (more…)

Send article as PDF to

In a post, Football and Faith at Jesus Creed, Scot McKnight inquires about players giving credit to God:

What do you make of this phenomenon?   Does it bother you?

We might consider this in the context of Merton’s description of Bernardian Love which progresses from 1) love of self for sake of self to 2) love of God for sake of self to 3) love of God for sake of God to 4) love of self for sake of God. This is reminiscent of but doesn’t map perfectly over C.S. Lewis’ 4 Loves.

Early on our journey, our loves of self & God for sake of self reflect part of our problem-solving, empirical, logical and practical rationalities, which we acquire through early humanization & socialization processes. At this point on our journey, we practice imperfect contrition, for example, sorry for the consequences that we suffer from our sin. We also enjoy an enlightened self-interest, which helps us function in society as we focus on the extrinsic rewards of shunning vice and embracing virtue (vis a vis Ignatius’ degrees of humility, for example). Some say our faith, here, is clear but tentative.

Later on our journey, we come to love God for the sake of God and pursue the intrinsic rewards of truth, beauty and goodness for their own sake. We are sorry for the consequences that our sin has on others and on our relationship to God, perfect contrition. We move beyond but not without our earlier loves, our imperfect contrition and our enlightened self-interest. We move beyond but not without our problem-solving, dualistic rationalities to a more contemplative (nondual) and robustly relational approach to God and others and an agapic love. We move beyond the mere functionality of socialization to the more robust relationality of transformation. Some say our faith, here, is obscure but certain.

This discussion continues below. (more…)

Send article as PDF to