Posts Tagged ‘William James’


By the way, I forgot to mention –
I have not investigated this in depth but have had some sneaking suspicions re: Maritain’s integral approach and how he overcame the extrinsicism. Both Charles Sanders Peirce and Jacques Maritain were heavily influenced by John of St. Thomas. I haven’t done a thorough compare and contrast on how they appropriated his semiotic. Hartshorne (who heavily informs Jack Haught’s work), in turn, was immersed in Peirce (in many ways). His own panentheism and notion of nonstrict identity appeal to me. Polkinghorne gets a tad too specific for my tastes but his general idea that God is interacting with nature at its boundaries resonates with my intuition that creation’s initial, boundary and limit conditions leave all of the ontological space necessary for divine energies and pneumatological in-form-ation to accomplish in all temporal frames (past, present, future) whatsoever the Spirit so desires (Bracken, Neville). The Radical Orthodoxy folks are correct, I believe, in their neoplatonic intuitions, even if they are somewhat wrong in their account of epistemological methods; yes, the world is enchanted through and through. Radical Orthodoxy has no business blaming modernism on Scotus, though.


The transcendental thomists were not the only ones to reject the neo-scholastic extrinsicism.  Maritain, through his existential thomism and integral humanism also said that grace works within nature. And Maritain did not fall into the kantian trap of the transcendentalists but employed a critical realist epistemology. Thomism had its problems.See http://www.innerexplorations.com/philtext/john.htm
and the over against a sterile hierarchicalism http://www.innerexplorations.com/philtext/ph7.htm

re: if one can explain something without invoking divine agency, then it’s of the natural or creaturely realm?


This systematic theology doesn’t employ such distinctions as are found in supernaturalism. In a theology of symbols, the distinction between natural endowments and supernatural gifts doesn’t arise and there is no dualism between material and nonmaterial realms. Divine presence and activity are at all levels and in all realms of life.


Indeed, as you point out regarding our various faculties and values, our cosmology (Everybody’s Story) can account for all of these scientific (descriptive), philosophic (normative) and cultural (evaluative) causes and effects apart from God (theologically) and without any reference to a soul (metaphysically). I would say, then, that our cosmology accounts for our normal experience of truth, beauty,  goodness and unity.

Our interpretive axis, we believe – after leaping, relates us to a religious dimension of experience in which we enjoy a heightened sense of truth, beauty, goodness and unity, which we attribute to the divine presence and activity in the world. And we experience the divine presence and activity in the world in varying degrees. We may also experience, in varying degrees, the lack thereof.

This interpretive stance thus primarily entails an amplification of epistemic risk that is ordered toward an augmentation of human value-realizations (truth, beauty, goodness, unity). It is not primarily adopted as an explanatory strategy with an aim to close various gaps in our cosmological knowledge, as if what we can explain is physical and what we cannot must be metaphysical, as if what we can explain is natural and what we cannot must be supernatural, divine or otherwise. Any such categorical scheme based on explanatory adequacy or a lack thereof falls prey to the “god of the gaps” charge. The religious dimension of our experience, then, invites an interpretive stance that is primarily an axiological strategy and is not, for the most part, aimed at cosmological and ontological explanations. It is more theosis than theoria, more practical than speculative, though not without propositional aspects, to be sure.

Thus the invocation of divine agency, essentially, is an interpretive stance, primarily an axiological strategy; it’s neither a cosmological nor ontological explanation. However, you left a similar question begging. Why invoke the metaphysical concept of the soul, the faculties of which are otherwise explained scientifically?

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From the NPR Forum 13.7 on Cosmos & Culture

In the context of this thread and also “Nature, And Something Else Beside Nature,” it seems to me that values like truth, beauty, goodness & unity can be realized in abundance (and I’m not denying that one can also be frustrated to no end in their pursuit) and that what we know from Everybody’s Story (our shared cosmology) is necessary & sufficient for such value-realizations. As I conceive it, this cosmology integrally relates the otherwise autonomous methods of science, philosophy & culture, methods that are, respectively, descriptive, normative & evaluative. By abundance, I mean “good enough” & not anything in an absolute sense. By “everybody’s story,” I mean we shouldn’t imagine that we can go around willy nilly making all this stuff up.

Ursula described friends who inhabit “something else” beside the cosmology that I described. In addition to our descriptive, normative & evaluative methods, what each inhabits is an interpretive stance. If w/Wm.James we describe this “move” as a vital, forced & live option, then it is only by going beyond but not without our cosmology that would make the option live. Interpretive stances are tautological & thus add no new information to our systems. Many report that their inhabitation of same relates them to a dimension of experience in which they somehow enjoy a heightened sense of value-realization (e.g. truth, beauty, goodness, unity) over & above any normal experience. An interpretive axis is primarily an axiological strategy and will more so engage our participatory imagination (hometown knowledge) than our propositional cognition (conceptual map-making). As tautologies, they do not provide ontological & cosmological explanations & are thus more practical than speculative. This practical significance might be aesthetic, affective or existential. Any reasoning from is to ought should take place in our cosmology b/c the propositional aspects of interpretive stances are too highly speculative to be given normative impetus.

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As one goes back and forth between substance vs process vs experience vs other approaches, all which systematically employ different root metaphors & axioms, one needs to be able to re-boot or re-axiomatize, prescinding to a meta-critical level, because certain terms and categories that work in one system are nonsensical in another (for example, natural & supernatural distinctions).  At bottom, in my view, theologies of nature are confessional, literary works and not apologetic, philosophical arguments. They have more iconographic value, which stimulates our participatory imaginations in forming our desires for the Kingdom with performative impetus, than propositional value, which would aid our cosmology with informative significance.

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My chief critique of thomism, even with the extrinsicism corrected and the epistemology being a critical realism, would generally involve a protest of its essentialistic categories. And a buy-into a nominalistic process approach is no cure. But I am sure you recall Jim’s fascination with the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics, Jungian synchronicity, Sheldrake’s morphogenetic fields and such? This was Jim’s attempt to infuse thomism’s formal causation with deeply dynamic characteristics. This strategy, in my view, made for a very coherent via media between essentialism and nominalism in metaphysics. Mind you, if someone put a gun to my head, I’d go with the Copenhagen interpretation and wouldn’t give Sheldrake’s work the time of day. But substantively (no pun intended), I could see what Jim was doing and it was not unlike Jack Haught’s discussion of mutually interpenetrating fields, for example. To be very clear, I applaud these metaphysical projects and recognize them as hypotheses. I just do not do metaphysics having been preoccupied as I have over the years with epistemology and, let’s say, meta-metaphysics. And to be even more clear, what Arraj did and his manner of appropriating Maritain’s existential thomism makes it laregly immune from the critiques of thomism that I launched in that article. In a phrase, it’s good stuff.

Now, Gelpi’s transmuted experience hypothesis also corrects the essentialism, the naive realism and the extrinsicism under consideration. Even then, his model remains encumbered by dualistic conceptions like natural and supernatural grace, created and uncreated grace, and addresses Christian conversion without giving much of an account of how the grace might work in other traditions. I offer no serious, much less fatal, critique of his project, other than to point out that, it too, is a fallible hypothesis, which he’d be the first to suggest. Further, I only want to point out that there is more space open for theological discussion than one might first imagine when considering Gelpi’s account. Specifically, we would all want to address religious conversion in nonChristian traditions. In that regard, what Gelpi sees going on in Christian conversion, I would say is also taking place in other traditions wherever people are opening themselves to spiritual transcendence, experiencing creation’s pneumatic features, engaging their pneumatological imagination, lovingly participating in co-creativity and articulating such experiences with some type of pneumatological theory, however inchoate, however symbolized, however celebrated and realized. None of this is to deny that a Christological account might/should have a universal normative impetus with profound practical implications, fostering a journey where one moves much more swiftly and with much less hindrance. It is to say that that shouldn’t be one’s starting point in interreligious dialogue and needn’t be one’s starting point in theological anthropology, even if one buys into the Fall and classical substitutionary atonement theory, which I do not.

As regards epistemology in general, nowadays, most folks are critical realists, whether foundational, nonfoundational or postfoundational. Most have responded to the postmodern critique. So, even the foundationalists acknowledge weakened foundations. The important thing is that one has moved from a naive to some form of critical realism. After that, one reaches the point of diminishing returns vis a vis epistemic virtue by picking a nit with one school or another. This is to say, if you like existential thomism and Maritain, especially as interpreted and expanded by our late pal, Jim, I think that will serve you very well, indeed. I know it is never far away from my epistemological machinations, whether as my system dujour or foil! That is not the type of approach that falls victim to my critique and is not what I had in mind, which was mostly the old extrinsicism, essentialism and a priorism. As for the dualisms, like natural and supernatural grace, created and uncreated grace, it is my intent to open up the theological space for such hypotheses to blossom and thrive, should they be consistent in fostering human conversions and authenticity a la Lonergan/Gelpi. Those dualisms may not articulate MY preferred account of grace but I do not mean to dismiss them, only to suggest that it mustn’t be thought that things are necessarily so vis a vis an essential Christianity, in particular, or pneumatology, in general. In fact, like metaphysics, I do not think I really have a theological position on grace, only a meta-theological stance that suggests we needn’t rush to closure and have no warrant to get too very dogmatic regarding one account versus another, as long as such an account meets other criteria of epistemic and theological virtue.

Finally, not all postmodern approaches are created equal. I am not advocating a radically deconstructive postmodernism or relativism, which is the prevailing caricature of the postmodern bogeyman. There are those who do, but they do so rhetorically and not systematically; nihilism doesn’t do systems. Not all pragmatism is created equal. Rorty’s vulgar pragmatism is not related to Peirce’s realism. Finally, even regarding Peirce, I only appropriate the rudiments of his approach and am not sure I’d buy into anyplace where he gets overly metaphysical, which doesn’t really interest me. In conclusion, while many have adopted a so-called critical realism, their rather dogmatic insistence on approaching reality one way over all others betrays a practical naive realism, which leads to fundamentalisms. That’s why I adopted the mantra that our deontologies should be considered as tentative as our ontologies are speculative. And until someone comes up with a metaphysic that reconciles gravity and quantum mechanics, in my view, they all remain highly speculative. My biggest appeals are for epistemic holism and humility.

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To explain the relationship between nature and grace, there is an open space theologically to consider alternatives other than

1) an extrinsicism, where the supernatural acts as a superstructure alongside or above human nature and with such distinctions as between an immanent and an economic trinity

2) thematic grace, where grace penetrates, perfects and transforms nature within human nature as discovered by a priori, rationalistic transcendental methods and interpreted using essentialistic categories

3) transmuted experience, where grace penetrates, perfects and transforms nature within human nature as discovered by consulting experience a posteriori and interpreted per the various dynamic structures of human development as they are transformed in a distinctly Christian conversion employing distinctions like created and uncreated grace, natural and supernatural grace.

The hypothesis being supported in our contemplative phenomenology employs the concept of grace as transmuted experience, where grace penetrates, perfects and transforms nature within human nature as discovered by consulting experience a posteriori and as interpreted per the various dynamic structures of human development as they experience creation’s basic and pneumatic features. Such experiences inform a pneumatological imagination out of which emerges a theology of Spirit (pneumatology), which in Eastern theology treats grace as the fruits of the Spirit without needing to develop such a concept as created grace.

In this anthropology, human nature is biosemiotically distinct as the symbolic species. In this theology, the creature-Creator distinction and deification are both affirmed as our union with God is via the uncreated divine energies, hence neither hypostatic nor substantial as in the Incarnation and Trinity, respectively. What the West refers to as supernatural is signified in the East by these energies. Creation’s primal ground, primal origin, primal cause, primal destiny, primal being, primal support, primal context or primal matrix would be the act of creation, apart from which God is otherwise indeterminate. This hypothesis thus implicitly employs a vague panentheism that aspires to a successful reference of the Creator, Whom we cannot hope to otherwise successfully describe, whether in terms of substance, process, experience or other ontologies.

The implicit theological anthropology of this hypothesis does recognize our participatory role in this dynamic creative process and the distinctly symbolic nature of our co-creative activity does lead us to further specify it as a pan-semio-entheism. The Spirit thereby acts in a manner that is ineluctably unobtrusive but utterly efficacious, not unlike other semiotic realities with their formal, final and quasi causations and rather tacit dimensions.

Relying on observations and experiences and describing them with vague categories that can be affirmed phenomenologically, this hypothesis does take into account different types of continuity and discontinuity but does not try to prove too much metaphysically. That is to say that it does not try to determine too much epistemically, to specify too much ontologically or aspire to say more than we can possibly know about the precise nature of various continuities and discontinuities.

This theology, we suggest, is informed by the best of Western philosophy, a pragmatic and semiotic realism, which well articulates the logical import of our categories, but also the best insights of our Eastern traditions, which well emphasize the aesthetical and practical, hence axiological, import of our pneumatological vision, which blurs any sharp distinctions between the exoteric-mythical and esoteric-mystical, between dogma and experience, between conceptual map-making and participatory imagining, between a philosophic parsing and a contemplative being-with (Indian anubhava).

Our consideration is not just systematic but historical. We want to exploit the creative tension between aggiornamento and ressourcement, bringing our theology up to date by returning to our sources. The dualistic accretions of a neoscholastic extrinsicism take many forms, most of them insidious. Outside the faith, with their explicit sacred-secular divide, they fostered modernist excesses, naturalism and atheism. Within the faith, they fed an hierarchicalism that infantilized the laity.

See http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=3069

Also, see http://www.spiritualitytoday.org/spir2day/833545gelpi.html

It is this extrinsicism that the transcendental thomists tried to overcome. Our critique of Rahner, Lonergan and deLubac is thus sympathetic. That grace perfects nature and gratuitously so, we can all agree. How this happens and what methods we employ in the discovery and defense of our accounts of how this happens has a great practical significance for our anthropology, formative spirituality, soteriology, ecclesiology and practical life of faith.

Archiving some random thoughts here for future reference -
Cyber-passersby, make what you will of them
Some clarifying thoughts regarding grace

The formulations as popularly understood might be characterized as Catholic, Reformed and Orthodox, respectively, those of scholasticism, extrinsicism & palamism.

Palamism is asking the question of how it is that God gives himself. It thus introduces the distinction of divine energies, which is theological. This has to do with transforming union or deification as distinguished from the hypostatic union (Incarnation) and substantial union (Trinity). It is concerned theologically with the cause of grace and also ad intra and ad extra distinctions of the immanent and economic trinity. One practical upshot of this question and answer for us is that it would thus bolster our contention that deification is humanization and would further address our interest in hesychastic prayer experiences.

Scholasticism was asking the question of how it is that man receives God. It thus introduces the distinction of created grace, which is metaphysical. It is concerned metaphysically with the created effects of the uncreated cause. One practical upshot of this question and answer for us is that we should be able to consult our experience to find evidence of Lonerganian conversions.

Extrinsicism was asking questions about the nature of God’s gift of self. It thus introduces the distinction between justification, which is freely given, hence extrinsic, and sanctification, which requires self-denial and trust in God, hence intrinsic. One practical upshot of this question and answer for us is that our contemplation of this gift will lead us into a grateful response of co-creative participation and cooperation.

I bring this up not just to reconcile these formulations but to point out that the palamism is a better fit for my particular project because I am trying to frame up an essential pneumatology using only vaguely phenomenological categories and not robustly metaphysical terms. This Eastern approach is not philosophical.  It articulates essential elements of Christianity and leaves the philosophical space open for various metaphysical formulations, just like my pan-semio-entheism articulates my essential theological vision with some vague phenomenological categories (both theologically and anthropologically) that still leave much philosophical space open for various metaphysical formulations, for example, including different philosophies of mind and different root metaphors for ontologies (substance, process, experience, etc).

So, again, while I do not have need of such distinctions as natural and supernatural grace, created and uncreated grace, that is because I am not asking those particular questions and have no need in my particular project, then, for those metaphysical formulations. Further, I am suggesting that when metaphysical questions do arise, there are many different ways to approach them that would still be compatible with my essential pneumatology. Where the causes of our humanization-deification are concerned, I am comfortable saying they’re entirely supernatural. Quite often, not always, scholasticism was providing distinctions without a difference. Other of its distinctions had little practical import for the life of faith, providing answers to questions few others were asking.

I remain committed to a wider ecumenical synthesis – nothing facile, not syncretistic. Some differences are real enough and difficult. But others are due to our pluralistic approaches which differ in emphasis and in the nature of the questions being asked. And some that we imagine are propositional are nonpropositional. Sometimes people are describing phenomenal experiences and we misinterpret those as ontological conclusions or theological positions. This is the type of stuff I wish to clear away.


We know we are not separated from God but we do not know exactly how that works. We know we are distinct from God and we do not know exactly how that works. We even know that we are connected to other humans without knowing exactly how that works; for example, philosophy of mind questions remain open. But we know we are distinct from other humans, too. We have a self. The divine is coming at us with grace but we do not know exactly how that works. We are free, for example, to cooperate with grace. We often fail to thus cooperate because we are finite and make mistakes. Sometimes our failure results from a refusal, which is sin.
As to how all of this stuff works metaphysically? I am saying that there are many hypotheses, some better than others. Even after we’ve decided on which might be the best ones, employing as much epistemic virtue as we can muster, it seems way too early on humankind’s journey to dogmatically insist on one vs another. The same is true for the theological hypotheses. There are different accounts, some clearly better than others. But even once we’ve decided on the best accounts around, it is still too early for us to dogmatically insist on one vs the other. We can attempt to demonstrate the practical import of holding to one account or the other, as Gelpi does in putting forth his account vs Rahner’s.

I do think that by bringing the East and West together we will get closer to articulating even better accounts. Sometimes this is done poorly and that has profound practical significance! And when it is done well, that can be a very good thing, indeed!

I have paid some attention to the Asian Bishops Conference over the years and find their work very stimulating.

Check out: http://www.ucanews.com/html/fabc-papers/fabc-96.htm where they write, for example:

2.1.2.3 Trinitarian and Spirit-Centered

The whole framework of Eastern Theology is Trinitarian. This is very much reflected in the liturgy, as well as in the theology centered on the economy of salvation. At the same time, due importance is given to the theology of co-penetration/mutual indwelling (perichoresis). In expounding the doctrine of the Trinity the Eastern Church Fathers took the three persons as the starting point, and thence passed to the one nature; while the Western thought most frequently followed the opposite coursefrom the one nature to the three persons. The Eastern way, in conformity to the Holy Scripture and to the baptismal formula that names the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, starts from the concrete. For the Eastern Church, if one speaks of God, it is always in the concrete: the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob; the God of Jesus Christ; it is always the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Eastern Theology gives special importance to the Holy Spirit. In the Eastern theological understanding, much emphasis is given to the sending of the Holy Spirit (Pentecost) as the fruit of the Christ event. Christ returns to the Father so that the Spirit may be sent. According to St. Basil there is no gift conferred on the creature in which the Holy Spirit is not present. Whereas the work of Christ is seen as concerning human nature which he recapitulates in his hypostasis, the work of the Holy Spirit concerns persons, being applied to each one singly. The Holy Spirit is acclaimed as the source of sanctification. According to Eastern thinking Christ is the sole image appropriate to the common nature of humanity, and the Holy Spirit grants to each person the possibility of fulfilling the likeness in the common nature.

In the Eastern tradition grace is treated in the theology of the Spirit (Pneumatology), as the fruits of the Holy Spirit. The theology of grace is the same as a developed treatise within the theology of the Spirit. Consequently, Easterners have not developed the concept of created grace,  a term that appeared in the Western theological tradition.


Pan-semio-entheism is new to you? I’m glad because that is my neologism for my approach and I’m hoping it makes its way into the theological literature via my collaboration with Amos Yong.  Here’s what is going on with it.

You are familiar, of course, with panentheism. And it has both orthodox and heterodox parsings. I stick with the orthodox pan-entheism, whereby God indwells in all things, not the panen-theism, whereby all things are within/part of God but God is more than the sum of all things.  Often, panentheism is described in metaphysical terms using substance or process approaches. What I am doing is saying that I am agnostic to which metaphysic might best articulate what is really going on but that we can back away from any robustly metaphysical approach to a more vague phenomenological perspective and say that, for example, however one might conceive the soul, whether as some Cartesian ghost in a machine, via some aristotelian hylomorphism, some whiteheadian conception or even in a physicalist sense, we do know, phenomenologically, that there is something semiotic going on — as we are immersed in a social milieu of icons, indexes, symbols and radical relationality. I suppose that my pan-semio-entheism is a phenomenological lead in to a theological extension that much of our relationship to God is going to be sacramental and that signs and symbols are utterly efficacious in effecting the realities they bring to mind. This would clash with any anthropology that overemphasizes our dialectical imagination or that gets radically apophatic and wouldn’t resonate with approaches that are not incarnational or that see us as totally depraved and alienated from God.


Biosemiotically distinct means that, even though much of creation is semiotic and, most simply put, employs signs, that Homo sapiens is unique in its employment of symbols. This is a very technical distinction but it figures largely in the work of Terry Deacon, a neuorscientist who wrote the book The Symbolic Species, and from a more popularized source, figures largely in the work of the late Walker Percy, the famous Catholic author from Louisiana. It is a scientific account of a certain type of radical discontinuity between us and our phylogenetic cousins. A thomistic analog might be “ontological density” ? Classically, I guess this would roughly map over the concept of soul. This extends into a theological notion, I would reckon, of us being outfitted as an imago Dei?


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Vatican01We must remain mindful of an important distinction re: so-called common views, does one mean a view commonly held by academics & theologians or that held by the majority of persons no matter their education. That will be in play, below. Another critical distinction is that between the Catholic hierarchy or magisterial teaching office (a/k/a Rome) versus mainstream theologians versus even what the faithful (sensus fidelium) actually believe and practice.

Perhaps the most critical distinction in play, however, is that between more progressive and more traditional believers. At the extreme, progressives have a tendency, it seems, to treat what might really be essential or core as accidental or peripheral. For their part, ultra-traditionalists have a tendency to treat what might really be accidental or peripheral as essential or core.

vaticancouncilA question that begs, then, is what could one possibly mean by the qualifier REALLY core or peripheral. While it is true that, in addition to Scripture & Tradition, Faith & Reason, Mysticism & Experience, Catholics have another leg to our stool called the Magisterium or hierarchical teaching office, in THEORY the Magisterium is NOT structured as a TOP-DOWN reality, although IN PRACTICE, that dynamic does seem to be in effect, at least in part, because their’s is a “temporal” power of the purse and of juridical authority that very much controls the destiny of many people’s lives vis a vis their expression of and experience of church. Being less abstract: 1) women cannot be ordained 2) some priests must remain celibate 3) some politicians get visibly interdicted at the communion rail 4) some ex-priests cannot teach in a parochial school because they weren’t laicized via a formal dispensation 5) some divorced and remarried teachers, similarly, are turned away from church employment because they did not obtain a marriage annulment.

In theory though, the Magisterium is only supposed to articulate the faith and morals that it has faithfully, diligently and dutifully observed via an active listening process, whereby it has discerned, BOTTOM-UP, what has already been received through the aid of the Holy Spirit by the Faithful, the sensus fidelium. In other words, the universal church asks: What is the sense of the faithful? And the Magisterium, speaking on our behalf, should respond with what the church, broadly conceived, has properly gathered and practiced via scripture, tradition, reason and experience. Let’s just say that many of us recognize that, just like with scriptural exegesis and interpreting God’s Word, this process of interpreting the sensus fidelium and articulating its beliefs is a tad more problematical than many, including those both in the hierarchy and the laity, seem able to imagine.

What do I think is going on?

canterburyCatholic progressives, both Roman and Anglican, are more closely related hermeneutically to each other than they are to their coreligionists in their respective denominations. Same thing with our traditionalist brothers and sisters. Increasingly, I have found that progressive Roman and Anglican catholics have a GREAT deal in common with much of liberal Protestantism and the emerging church conversation(s). This is to say that we are in large agreement regarding essentials vs accidentals, core vs peripheral beliefs. I am in much more agreement with the Anglican approach to moral doctrine, church disciplines and church polity than I am with my own Roman tradition, but these are not essentials in my view, while our creeds, our sacraments, our liturgical traditions and incarnational outlooks are. Otherwise, out of personal integrity, I’d have to offer myself up in the recent prisoner swap (yes, that’s a euphemism for a recent impolitic event).

What makes one distinctly catholic?

It is not atonement theory. Most Franciscans, following Scotus, don’t buy into the notion that the incarnation was a divine initiative in response to some earthly felix culpa.

harvardIt’s not Greek metaphysics. Even the hierarchy is clear in that science and philosophy are autonomous from faith. While theological discourse will employ inculturated language in articulating beliefs, it is no more tied to this or that metaphysical concept than it is tied to a particular language. It simply translates the essentials of the faith into this or that idiom. I am heavily invested in the American pragmatist tradition (Peirce, less so James, much less so Dewey) and the best parts of our Transcendentalist tradition (Josiah Royce) and don’t do substance metaphysics or Thomism, so my (meta)metaphysical constructs are going to be nondual vis a vis a triadic semiotic. Rome doesn’t publish catechisms in this idiom, only a group of folks who belong to the John Courtney Murray Society at Berkeley find it engaging (best I can tell, anyway; I’m not an academic and I do not get around much).

I could go on dismissing what is not essential and trying to overcome stereotypes, which we have earned, but …

Essentially, the catholic outlook on created reality is radically incarnational, rejects moral depravity, sees all of creation as intrinsically good even if flawed, sees created realities mediating the God-encounter & is thus sacramental. Catholicism embraces faith and reason (fides et ratio) but rejects any conflation of science, philosophy and faith, viewing these approaches to reality as methodologically autonomous, hence rejecting fideism and scientism. Essential dogma is contained in the creeds with other stuff up for grabs, although controversy surrounds the only two so-called infallible pronouncements ever articulated, the Assumption and Immaculate Conception, which is more vs less problematical depending on how one conceives so-called “original” sin. There is the matter of the Petrine Ministry, but that, too, could be more narrowly or broadly conceived (e.g. creeping infallibilism).

Finally, coming full circle back to the aim of this thread, there is the question of whether or not there can even be such a thing as a Christian Philosophy or a Theological Anthropology or a Religious Epistemology. And my answer, and I’m pretty sure the orthodox Catholic answer, is no. Anthropology is science. Epistemology is philosophy. Metaphysics belong to various philosophical schools.

designinferenceDo people articulate anthropologies, epistemologies, metaphysics and philosophies that would be incompatible with faith? Of course, but that’s because they are doing bad anthropology, bad epistemology, bad metaphysics and bad philosophy, in ways that don’t employ philosophical rigor and can’t withstand philosophical scrutiny. Do believers articulate scientific and philosophical perspectives derived from their religious stances? Sure, but that’s because they’re doing bad science and bad philosophy. In other words, category errors are not uncommon.

From the Archbishop of Canterbury to the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, yesterday, 19 November 2009:

Therefore the major question that remains is whether in the light of that depth of agreement the issues that still divide us have the same weight – issues about authority in the Church, about primacy (especially the unique position of the pope), and the relations between the local churches and the universal church in making decisions (about matters like the ordination of women, for instance).  Are they theological questions in the same sense as the bigger issues on which there is already clear agreement?  And if they are, how exactly is it that they make a difference to our basic understanding of salvation and communion?  But if they are not, why do they still stand in the way of fullervisible unity?  Can there, for example, be a model of unity as a communion of churches which have different attitudes to how the papal primacy is expressed?

The central question is whether and how we can properly tell the difference between ‘second order’ and ‘first order’ issues. When so very much agreement has been firmly established in first-order matters about the identity and mission of the Church, is it really justifiable to treat other issues as equally vital for its health and integrity?”

This discussion continues below >>> (more…)

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Thom Stark at Jesus Politics is sponsoring a competition, which I couldn’t really enter because I don’t buy the contest’s premise that would require me to demonstrate that Thom employs erroneous presuppositions that control his interpretive options, especially regarding Biblical hermeneutics. The whole discussion is evocative though and, in response, I wrote this tongue-in-cheek parody, below.

Hang Down Your Head Thom Stark

A thoroughgoing solipsist, still, Thom finds it useful to suspend his disbelief in other minds. An incurable nihilist, still, Thom finds it useful to suspend his disbelief in reality’s intelligibility.

vonnegut01As did Kurt Vonnegut, Thom enjoys his life in this incredible chronosynclastic infundibulum, where all is at once both true and false (this recognizing that Thom has also suspended his disbelief in the silly notion that such concepts as true and false successfully refer). While so-called First Principles, like noncontradiction and excluded middle, certainly entertain Thom, he sees that they only work within formal symbol systems, the axioms of which remain otherwise unprovable within that system, which, itself, remains either incomplete or inconsistent. Incompleteness and inconsistency are concepts which, paradoxically, do appear to make successful references to reality insofar as they add no new information to Thom’s otherwise unintelligible tautological accounts.

Even if these interpretive stances remain otherwise empirically indemonstrable and rationally unprovable, still, Thom finds them practically indispensable. Of course, Thom’s pragmatism is strictly strategic and in no way philosophical. Thom feels this way notwithstanding any reductio ad absurdum arguments, which could only serve to suggest that his approach is to many unpalatable and not to otherwise demonstrate that it is – to use their categories, not Thom’s – untrue. So, Thom actively suspends his disbelief in other minds, in reality’s unintelligibility and in so-called First Principles because he finds such noninferential, nonpropositional, evaluative posits just positively liberating.

This silliness continues below. (more…)

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